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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigates whether the large shareholders of small and medium firms (SMEs) take 
advantage of the inside information and decrease their shares before their operation performance begins to decline 
after the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). By using the data from annual reports of SMEs listed on Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in China from 2004 to 2006, this study explores both the relationship and the interaction effects between 
the change of operation performance and the ownership concentration of SMEs around their IPOs. The statistic 
analysis indicates that there is a significantly positive relationship between the ownership concentration and their 
operation performance after IPOs during the sample period. Moreover, the companies with higher ownership 
decreasing encounter more severe operation performance decline, which sugests that the listed companies intend to 
package their book profits before IPOs for the sake of increasing their issuing prices and enlarge their financing 
scales. 
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1.  Introduction 
The declining of operation performance, during the initial period after IPO, is mainly affected by two 
factors. On one hand, financial packaging is used to improve performance. On the other hand, Ownership 
and management are separated gradually. The ill corporate governance structure is the main systematic 
cause of the situation, while ownership structure is the property basis of corporate governance structure. 
Moreover it is reflected by ownership concentration which is its determinant and come to affect operation 
performance.  
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICAPIE Organization 
Committee. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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The capital market provides a direct financing platform for the firms. However, there is a problem that 
how they make best use of this platform in the markets in value maximization centric to build suitable 
capital structure, which is worthy of discussion and study. Hence the study on the effect of ownership 
concentration (i.e. the large top 5 shareholders) on operation performance (i.e. the return on quity), which 
is in case of making suitable program for the development of ownership concentration and improve 
operation performance, is profound significant. 
Therefore this paper studies the fluctuating rates of the ownership concentration and focus on the 
initial stage, which is designed to understand the change and investigate the relationship between 
ownership concentration and performance decline ration. 
2. Literature Review 
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between the ownership concentration and 
performance. There are mainly three viewpoints of it. The survival of large shareholders has a positive 
effect on the corporation, which is agreed by Shleifer and Vishny（1986）who found that ownership 
intensity can improve performance through reducing the free-rider problems and  racing up to top. The 
investigation of Wruck（1989）which reported a significant positive influence of non-monotonic 
RM ,followed by the increase of ownership intensity. Similar evidence have been obtained by Agrawal 
and Mandelker(1990) who supported the Shleifer and Vishny（1986）’s research hypothesis, who 
agreed that the survival of big shareholders contributes to better regulation and performance, especially 
the ownership is concentrated in institutional investors. 
On another hand, Grossman and Hart (1988) argued that because of private benefit of control which 
led to the problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholder while they analyzed the 
disproportionate benefit the shareholders held. In that context, Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi（1997) 
showed that inhibition of management motive is caused by overregulation, which will increase the 
implicit cost led by ownership concentration. The empirical studies conducted using Chinese data have 
yielded the same results. For example, Shi (2000) investigated 484 companies listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) in 1999 and found that there is a there, rather than a nonlinear relationship 
between ROE and ownership concentration , and the negative association holds for all groups. 
However, there is a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and performance in 
America and Germany highlighted by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) considering the effect of 
supervisions and embezzlements. In a seminal article, Morck(1988) examined the relationship between 
insider ownership, represented by the share ownership of board members, and firm performance, 
represented by Tobin’s Q. They found a significant non-monotonic relationship; Tobin’s Q increases 
when the insider ownership is below 5% or above 25%, but declines in between these two levels. The 
influence of both block ownership and insider ownership on firm performance was also subject to the 
investigation of McConnell (1990) which reported a significant positive influence of insider ownership. 
Further contributions to this debate have been made by Gao and Yu (2001) who demonstrated found 
indication of a convex relationship, i.e.U-shaped, between big shareholders and Tobin’s Q. 
3. Hypotheses 
According to the previous literature of earnings management during IPO, the firm performance will 
decline if any financial packaging is used. Under that environment, controlling shareholders will know 
the vetting procedures of listing or benefits brought by IPO and sell their holdings when they apply for 
quotation. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 1: ownership concentration will slump dramatically during the initial stage after IPO. 
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If owning competitiveness and developmental potential, with a view of sustainable management, listed 
company of which reduction rate will be lower than the poor growth ones. Will the firm with low 
declining rate of ownership concentration have lower declining rate of performance? Hence this paper 
focuses on examining the ROC of ownership concentration, operation performance. The listed companies 
are divided in two groups-the low and the high by the median. So 




The financial data for small-and-medium-sized companies are taken from the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) over the January 2004 to December 2006 sample period. There are 102 firms in total 
during this period. 21firms which are lacking of complete financial data (e.g. 002051) is eliminated. 
Based on above criteria, this paper extracts 81 SZSE listed firms for our analyses. 
It reveals that the properties of the stock are numerous after the initial inspection of the number of 
shares. According to listed censorship, the capital of the firm should be over RMB 3million. And that the 
shareholders whose rate of share held is over 3% in SME are rare, except the large of top 1. While the 
large shareholders (i.e. top 5) have a big influence on the firm, the variables we collect is based on them 
in the light of One-Share-One Vote Rule in our countries. 
As far as operating performance be concerned, investor will be tempted by Return on Equity (ROE) 
which can be the measures of profits.  
4.2 Measurement 
ROE: net profit/ Owners equity 
Fluctuating rate of ownership concentration: (LSRSH n+1 –LSRSH n ）/ LSRSH n. 
Fluctuating rate of ownership concentration: (LSRSH n+1 –LSRSH n) / LSRSH n 
Return on Net Assets(RONA):（RONA n+1 –RONA n）/ RONA n。 
The degree of Ownership concentration：Rate of the large shareholders 
LSRSH: Rate of the large shareholders 
LS: the top 5 shareholders 
LSRSH: Rate of the large shareholders 
5. Results 
5.1 The change of Ownership Concentration after IPO 
As show in Table I below, the mean value of large shareholders of top 5 creep down from 59.4191% to 
56.841% during sample periods gradually. Based on these information sources we get, the FIRSTS 
among large shareholders booms first and then followed by a ebbing. Moreover the minimum of the 
sample subsides with a range of 6.57%, bottoming out at 28.20%. It can be revealed that there is a 
dispersion tendency in ownership concentration. 
Based on these information sources, the following variable was determined for each year end of the 
investigation period. 
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Table I. The fluctuation of shares of top five shareholrers   
 Frequency Min Max Mean S.D. 
LS t=0 81 34.77% 79.72% 59.4191% 10.30067 
LS t=1 81 30.04% 77.73% 58.3570% 10.67368 
LS t=2 81 28.20% 89.23% 56.8410% 11.84950 
 
In order to analyze whether there is an obvious declining of the large shareholding, T-text of 81 firms’ 
data is used, which can be shown in Table II below. 
Table II  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS of top five shareholrers 
 Frequency Mean S.D. VAR 
LS t=1 – t=0  81 -.0172 .07062 .00785 
LS t=2 – t=1  81 -.0254 .11461 .01273 
 Test Value = 0.05 
 t df P Mean 95% Confidence Interval  
     Lower Upper 
LS     t=1 – t=0  -8.561 80 .000 -.0671 -.0828 -.0516 
LS     t=2 – t=1  -5.924 80 .000 -.0754 -.1008 -.0501 
 
It can be seen from the Table II that, the large shareholders will offload holdings after IPO, which will 
make the degree of t-value obviously. The mean value ranges from -0.0172 to -0.0254 during the first and 
second period in the slight of means and difference of means. And the gradual surging is observed, which 
caused by the offload holdings at a high figure of the large shareholders who want to get profits.  
5.2 The change of Operation Performance after IPO 
In the change of average, the firm performance increases gently during the initial stage after IPO 
followed by a subsiding. Considering the some firms listed at the end of the year among these samples, 
the increase of performance is lacking of objectivity, which will pull up it. There is no doubt that the 
appearance of the declining of performance appraise. 
Table III. Descriptive Statistics Of Operation Performance 
Frequency Min Max Mean S.D. 
ROE   t=0 81 2.12% 21.81% 9.8747% 3.17421 
ROE   t=1 81 -7.86% 29.99% 10.3047% 5.50951 
ROE   t=2 81 -27.42% 31.36% 9.0760% 8.23666 
Therefore it can be inferred that earnings management is used to package the finance report which will 
ensure the healthy financial performance while listing. 
Table IV. T-Statistics Of Operation Prformance Per year  
 Frequency Mean S.D. VAR 
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ROEt=1 – t=0  81 .020031 .41445 .04605 
ROEt=2 – t=1 81 -1.655874 13.354 1.4838 
 
 Test Value = 0.05 
 T df P Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
     Lower Upper 
ROE  t=1 – t=0  -.651 80 .517 -.02997 -.12161 .06167 
ROE  t=2 – t=1  -1.150 80 .254 -1.7059 -4.6588 1.2470 
 
It reveals that all the declining rates do not reach level of significance (α=o.1), since some shareholders 
who knows the firm performance quite well. Based on the information resource collected, most of the 
proportion the large hold is over 40% who can operate firm performance. If their annual reports represent 
firm performance, the average of operation performance reflected by the 81 listed firms is relatively 
stable. 
5.3 The relationship between variance ratio of ownership concentration and firm performance 
In order to find out whether in case that the large shareholders sell stocks and arbitrage with the 
advantages of relevant information. To begin with, the variance ratio of the top 5 large shareholders 
during the first and second year is worked out and ranked from the maximum to the minimum. The data is 
divided two groups by median, the higher      ownership concentration decreasing ration and the lower. 
The study is to investigate whether there are obvious differences, namely the slumping of ownership 
concentration accompanied by the slumping of firm performance after comparing the data of both groups.  
In the first year, 8 firms of which ROE is 0, is eliminated. The study is based on the ROE of the rest 73 
firms which are divided into two groups –the higher with frequency of 37 and the lower to test level of 
significance by the median -0.0186.The conclusion is shown by Table V and Table VI. 
Table V Descriptive Statistics Of Owership Structure On Operation Performance  
 The higher The lower 
Frequency 37 36 
Min -.79 -1.96 
Max .73 .68 
Mean .0444 -.0514 
S.D. .36732 .45588 
Table VI T-Statistics Of Owership Structure On Operation Performance  
 Frequency Mean S.D. VAR 
The higher 37 .0444 .36732 .06039 
The lower 36 -.0514 .45588 .07598 
 Test Value = 0.1 
 T df P Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
     Lower Upper 
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higher -.921 36 .363 -.05559 -.1781 .0669 
lower -1.992 35 .054 -.15136 -.3056 .0029 
 
Table V shows that the average of ROE changes is a positive value in the higher groups which reveals 
that it increases evenly while it is opposite in lower groups. Since the higher do not reach the level of 
significance, the two groups are incomparable in the first and second year during the first period. 
In the second year, we eliminate the firms of which ROE is 0. The study is based on the ROE of the 
rest 79 firms which are divided into two groups –the higher with frequency of 40 and the lower to test 
level of significance by the median -0.02454. The conclusion is shown by Table VII and Table VIII. 
Table VII  Descriptive Statistics Of Owership Structure On Operation Performance  
 The higher The lower 
Frequency 40 39 
Min -120.22 -3.39 
Max .64 1.34 
Mean -3.1589 -.1931 
S.D. 18.98737 .85701 
 
It can be seen from TableVII that the average of the higher is -3.1589 while -0.1931 in the lower. It 
comes to a conclusion that the subsiding in the larger will be followed by the subsiding of performance.  
Table VIII shows that the two sample groups meet T-text, which means that the statistics are 
significant. Consequently, the second hypothesis that company with higher ownership concentration 
decreasing ration encountered more severe performance decline is confirmed. 
Table VIII  T-Statistics Of Owership Structure On Operation Performance  
 Frequency Mean S.D. VAR 
The higher 40 -3.1589 18.98737 3.00217 
The lower 39 -.1931 .85701 .13723 
 Test Value = 0.1 
 T df P Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
     Lower Upper 
higher -1.086 39 .094 -3.25887 -9.3313 2.8136 
lower -2.136 38 .039 -.29312 -.5709 -.0153 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using a sample of SME during the sample period, the research analyzes the relationship between the 
change of ownership concentration and firm performance from 2004. It shows that in order to get the 
profits some shareholders offload holdings, which lead to the subsiding of ROE after IPO. Moreover the 
proportion of tradable shares, the ownership concentration and the structure of the ownership have big 
influence on performance. The following conclusions could be summed up from the analysis: 
There is a significant decrease of ownership concentration and performance of which the rate becomes 
more obvious when close to sample periods. Moreover, the Company with higher ownership 
concentration decreasing ration encountered more severe performance decline, which means that the 
listed companies will package their book profits during the stage after IPO for the sake of increasing the 
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issuing price and financing scales. However this situation can not last long while the financial data is a 
peak value and can not be continued, which can be seen from the gradual declining of the performance.  
The hypothesis made for the SMES board can not achieve the goal that expected for the reason that the 
innovation and perfection of system is not essential while the SME is during transition period. And also 
the measure of this study is a complex problem. There is not a single standard internal. And the data 
during the sample period which is replaced by the data next year can not be acquired because of the 
limited resource, which has an influence on the conclusion.  
The fundamental outlet is to transform the organization and environment of developments. The 
findings suggest that these firms should build supporting system of policy-making information to enhance 
follow-up evaluation of their developments based on performance appraisal. Then it should build 
supporting system with early warning and forecast through the renewal and perfection of the evaluation 
theory and method. What is worth mentioning is that the firms should raise their financial efficiency, 
which will make them to the mainstay of new developments. 
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